CVE-2026-119446 | BDVDB-2026-402792 Detail
nerves-hubnerves_hub_web
Description#
Session Fixation vulnerability in the CLI login flow in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain an API token for another user's account via a crafted login link. Starting a CLI login with POST /api/auth/cli_session needs no authentication and returns a polling token, a confirmation URL that carries that token, and a confirmation code. When a signed-in user opens that URL and clicks Confirm, NervesHub.Accounts.verify_cli_session_token/2 creates an API token for the user's account and stores it on the login, and the next poll of GET /api/auth/cli_session/<token> returns it to whoever started the login. The confirmation code is only displayed and is never compared with anything, so it cannot show that the person confirming is the one who started the login. The confirm form carries a CSRF token and the page cannot be framed, so the attacker has to persuade the user to open the link and click the button themselves. This issue affects nerves_hub: from 2.5.0 before 2.5.3.
Impact#
An attacker with no account obtains an API token for any NervesHub user they can persuade to open a link and click Confirm. The token acts as that user through the API in every organization they belong to, at their role, until the user deletes it on the account page. Signing out of the web does not revoke it.
Weaknesses#
- CWE-384 Session Fixation
References#
- https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web/security/advisories/GHSA-9vr9-463q-46qp
- https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-119446.html
- https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-119446
- https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web/commit/e6bf11a812d7aa8b69d854ba8ef02d65516f5564
- https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web/commit/3131f1701194b581ab4b3e5e9d81194fc9c83508
Exploit#
No public exploit known
History#
- Version 1Record published in the CVE List.